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PUBLIC LAW
ANTITRUST LAW
Michael R. Fontham*
A number of important antitrust cases were decided in the
federal courts in the past year. Two decisions rendered by the
courts of appeals have the potential of creating significant changes
in the antitrust process. These cases involve major issues in the
areas of the right of jury trial and the apportionment of damages
among tortfeasors. In addition, the Supreme Court decided three
significant antitrust cases, and other important decisions were
rendered at the court of appeals level.
MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS
In the most striking and potentially important recent develop-
ment in the field of antitrust, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that the complexity of an antitrust case is
a potential ground for denying the right to a jury trial. Another ma-
jor development was the split in the circuits that arose on the ques-
tion of whether a right of contribution exists among antitrust tort-
feasors, an issue that the Supreme Court agreed to review. Both of
these matters have substantial importance for antitrust litigants.
The Right to a Jury Trial in Antitrust Treble Damage Cases
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on the
jury trial issue occurred in In re Japanese Electronic Products An-
titrust Litigation.' In a departure from the prior holdings of the
Supreme Court and the weight of authority in the lower courts,' a
divided panel of the third circuit held that a jury trial may be
denied in an antitrust case "when a jury will not be able to perform
its task of rational decisionmaking with a reasonable understanding
of the evidence and the relevant legal standards."3 Japanese Elec-
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Member, New Orleans
Bar.
1. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
2. See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Fleitmann v.
Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916); In re United States Fin. Sec. Litiga-
tion, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom, Gant v. Union Bank, 100 S. Ct.
1866 (1980); Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Serv., Inc., 383 F.2d 97 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 904 (1968).
3. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Japanese Elec. Prod.].
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tronic Products is the biggest victory thus far for advocates of the
theory that the jury demand of a party may be stricken prior to the
trial on the ground that the case is too complicated to be understood
by a group of laymen.
4
In its decision, the third circuit recognized and held that the
right of jury trial is protected in antitrust cases by the seventh
amendment to the United States Constitution.5 However, the court
determined that this provision must be balanced against the due
process clause of the fifth amendment, which assertedly "precludes
trial by jury when a jury is unable to perform [its] task with a
reasonable understanding of the evidence and the legal rules."' The
due process objections to trial by jury in complex cases were ex-
pressed as follows:
The due process objections to jury trial of a complex case
implicate values of fundamental importance. If judicial decisions
are not based on factual determinations bearing some reliable
degree of accuracy, legal remedies will not be applied consistently
with the purposes of the laws. There is a danger that jury ver-
dicts will be erratic, and completely unpredictable, which would
be inconsistent with evenhanded justice. Finally, unless the jury
can understand the evidence and the legal rules sufficiently to
rest its decision on them, the objective of most rules of evidence
and procedure in promoting a fair trial will be lost completely . .. '
In light of these considerations, the court refused to "read the
seventh amendment to guarantee the right to jury trial in these
suits."8
The court also formulated standards for determining the com-
plexity of the case and the jury's ability to understand it.' It found,
first, that a district court should consider the "overall size" of the
case, including the estimated length of the trial, the amount of
evidence to be introduced, and the number of individual issues. Sec-
ond, the conceptual difficulty of understanding the legal issues and
the facts should be analyzed on the basis of such references as the
4. Id. at 1086. See, e.g., In re United States Fin. Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom, Gant v. Union Bank, 100 S. Ct. 1866 (1980). Schweg-
mann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Almaden Vineyards, Inc., - F. Supp. - (E.D.
La. 1980); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Radial
Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224 (N.D. Ill. 1977); In re
Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
5. 631 F.2d at 1079.
6. Id. at 1084.
7. Id. at 1084.
8. Id. at 1086.
9. Id. at 1088.
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"amount of expert testimony and the probable length and detail of
jury instructions." Third, the difficulty of segregating distinct
aspects of the case should be considered as "indicated by the
number of separately disputed issued [sic] relating to single transac-
tions or items of proof." 10
The decision indicated that the jury trials should be denied only
in unusual cases where "due process clearly requires a nonjury
trial."'" As a protection against any unnecessary dilution of the right
to a jury trial, the court noted the availability of the writ of man-
damus to remedy erroneous district court decisions prior to trial,
and required that a district court "make explicit findings on the
dimensions of complexity when it denies a jury trial in an action at
law on grounds of complexity."'2
The district court in Japanese Electronic Products had made no
determination as to whether the complexity of the case made it im-
possible for a jury to understand. Instead, the decision of the dis-
trict court was based on the determination that the seventh amend-
ment guarantee is applicable regardless of the complexity of the
case. 8 Thus, the third circuit simply vacated the order of the district
court and remanded for a consideration of whether the issues are
sufficiently complex to require the denial of a jury trial.'
The Applicable Precedent
The decision of the third circuit is a dramatic departure from
the state of the law in the antitrust field. On at least two occasions,
the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that the right to
a jury trial is guaranteed in antitrust treble damage actions. 5 The
Court has indicated that this right emanates not only from the
seventh amendment," but is implicitly guaranteed by the antitrust
statutes. Numerous other federal decisions have relied on the
theory that the right to a jury trial is absolute in antitrust actions. 8
10. Id.
11. Id at 1088.
12. Id. at 1089.
13. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litigation, 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa.
1979).
14. 631 F.2d at 1091.
15. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Fleitmann v. Welsbach
Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916).
16. Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916).
17. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
18. See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962);
Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Serv., Inc., 383 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 904 (1968); Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 57 F.R.D. 23 (N.D. Ohio
1972); Lah v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F.R.D. 198 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
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In addition, only months prior to the Japanese Electronic Products
decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed a ruling that struck a jury demand on the ground of com-
plexity in a securities case, and the Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari.1 '
The constitutional right to a jury trial in antitrust cases is
established under Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co.2" In
Fleitmann, the Court considered whether the jury trial guarantee of
the seventh amendment, which applies in all cases arising "at com-
mon law" 1 but does not apply to suits in equity, required a trial by
jury in a stockholder's derivative action for damages under the
Sherman Act. The combination of the "equitable" derivative action,
not covered by the seventh amendment, with the "legal" antitrust
suit requiring a jury trial under the seventh amendment, raised the
issue of whether the seventh amendment required a jury trial of the
combined action. The Court held that the seventh amendment would
apply to the antitrust suit absent the derivative action. It stated:
"Of course the claim set up is that of the corporation alone, and if
the corporation were proceeding directly under the statute no one
can doubt that its only remedy would be at law."' In addition to this
holding that antitrust suits are "legal" in nature and thus subject to
the jury trial guarantee of the seventh amendment, the Court held
that the combined action could not be tried without a jury. Although
no specific requirement of a jury trial is contained in the antitrust
laws, the Court apparently interpreted the statute to include the
right of jury trial. It said:
[W]e agree with the courts below that when a penalty of triple
damages is sought to be inflicted, the statute should not be read
as attempting to authorize liability to be enforced otherwise
than through the verdict of a jury in a court of common law. On
the contrary, it plainly provides the latter remedy, and it pro-
vides no other."
In another leading case involving the combination of an
equitable claim with an antitrust action, Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover,2' the Court again held that a jury trial is a right in an an-
titrust suit. In Beacon Theatres, the plaintiff sued for declaratory
and injunctive relief to prevent the institution against it by the
19. In re United States Fin. Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied sub nom, Gant v. Union Bank, 100 S. Ct. 1866 (1980).
20. 240 U.S. 27 (1916).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
22. 240 U.S. at 28.
23. Id. at 29.
24. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
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defendant of a treble damage suit under the antitrust laws. The de-
fendant counterclaimed, seeking treble damages under the antitrust
laws on the basis of the same controversy alleged in the complaint.
A jury trial was demanded by the defendant on the factual issues in
the case. The district court, however, held that the suit for decla-
ratory judgment and an injunction was essentially equitable and
should be tried prior to a jury trial on the counterclaims. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied a writ of mandamus." The
Supreme Court granted certiorari because "'[m ]aintenance of the
jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so
firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming cur-
tailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the
utmost care."'" The Court reversed the decision of the district
court, holding that Beacon Theatres "cannot be deprived of [its
rights to jury trial] merely because Fox took advantage of the
availability of declaratory relief to sue Beacon first.",
In reaching its decision, the Court specifically relied on and
cited the seventh amendment." It stated that "the right to a jury
trial is a constitutional one .. .while no similar requirement pro-
tects trials by the court .... " The Court also held that the right to
trial by jury applies to treble damage antitrust suits and was man-
dated in these cases by Congress. It stated:
Since the right by jury applies to treble damage suits under the
antitrust laws, and is, in fact, an essential part of the congres-
sional plan for making competition rather than monopoly the
rule of trade ... the Sherman and Clayton Act issues on which
Fox sought a declaration were essentially jury questions."
These rulings of the Supreme Court established the principle
that the right of jury trial is applicable in antitrust suits for treble
damages. They are supplemented by another leading decision of the
Supreme Court, Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,1
where the Court determined that the summary judgment procedure
should be "used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation . . . ."I The
Court indicated that trial by jury is appropriate in these cases.
"Trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury which so long
has been the hallmark of 'even handed justice."'33 In light of these
25. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1958).
26. 359 U.S. at 501, quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
27. 359 U.S. at 504.
28. Id. at 510.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 504 (citation omitted).
31. 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
32. Id. at 473.
33. Id.
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decisions of the Supreme Court, and other leading cases recognizing
the importance of the right of jury trial in cases arising at law,u the
decision in Japanese Electronic Products is a sharp departure from
precedent.
The Supreme Court's Footnote in Ross v. Bernhard
Although the decision in Japanese Electronic Products was
based primarily on the theory that due process limits the reach of
the seventh amendment in complex cases rather than on an analysis
of the "legal" or "equitable" nature of a complex antitrust suit,' the
genesis for the current debate over the applicability of the seventh
amendment in complex litigation is a footnote contained in the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in Ross v. Bernhard." The footnote sug-
gests that the practical abilities and limitations of juries is a factor
that may be considered in determining whether a claim is legal or
equitable in nature.8 1 This reference has provided a foundation for
claims that the complexity of a suit may justify the denial of the
right to a jury trial."
Ross was a stockholder's derivative action against the directors
of a closed-end investment company. The suit charged that the direc-
tors had breached their fiduciary duty; it also alleged a breach of a
contract. The plaintiffs demanded that the defendants "account for
and pay to the Corporation for their profits and gains and its
losses.""9 The district court denied a motion to strike the jury, but
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed on the ground
34. For instance, in Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Serv., Inc., 383
F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 904 (1968), the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a directed verdict for the defendant in an antitrust
case. The court stated:
We review the district court's direction of verdict for the defendants in the
light of the Supreme Court's statement that "the right to trial by jury applies to
treble damage suits under the antitrust laws, and is, in fact, an essential part of
the congressional plan for making competition rather than monopoly the rule of
trade . ...
383 F.2d at 103. In addition, in Therno-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp.,
294 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1961), the court followed Beacon Theatres in a suit involving
equitable and legal actions. Judge Wisdom, speaking for the court, stated: "While the
right to trial by jury is a constitutional one, no similar importance attaches to trial by
court." Id. at 490 See also Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 57 F.R.D. 23 (N.D. Ohio 1972);
Lah v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F.R.D. 198 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
35. Japanese Elec. Prod., 631 F.2d at 1083.
36. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
37. Id. at 538 n.10.
38. See, e.g., In re United States Fin. Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 424-26 (9th
Cir. 1979).
39. 396 U.S. at 532.
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that a derivative action is equitable in nature. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that "the right to jury trial attaches to those
issues in derivative actions as to which the corporation, if it had
been suing in its own right, would have been entitled to a jury."'0
Although Ross reaffirmed the broad commitment of the
Supreme Court to the right of jury trial, a footnote in the opinion
has been used as authority for limiting the right of jury trial in com-
plex cases. This footnote states:
As our cases indicate, the "legal" nature of an issue is determined
by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to
such question; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the prac-
tical abilities and limitations of juries. Of these factors, the first,
requiring extensive and possibly abstruse historical inquiry, is
obviously the most difficult to apply."
On the basis of this statement, some courts have found that the
right to a jury trial in any civil case is limited by the complexity of
the issues.'2 However, this interpretation is inconsistent with the
content and context of the Ross footnote.
The Ross footnote applies not to the determination of whether a
particular case must be tried to a jury, but to the prospective deci-
sion as to whether a newly created cause of action is legal or
equitable in nature. Thus, the footnote refers to determining "the
'legal' nature of an issue . . . "'I This reference indicates that the
practical abilities of jurors would be relevant to determining
whether an entire class of claims is legal or equitable in nature, but
it does not suggest that the courts analyze the abilities of jurors to
handle particular cases within those classes of claims that have
already been ruled "legal."" This point was made by Judge Friendly
of the second circuit in United States v. J.B. Williams Company,
Inc.," where the court upheld the right of jury trial in an FTC cease
and desist case. He said:
[T]he footnote in Ross v. Bernhard was part of an argument for
applying the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial where it
40. Id. at 532-33.
41. Id. at 538, n.10.
42. See, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Mach.
Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79
F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D.
Wash. 1976).
43. 396 U.S. at 538 n.10.
44. Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 227-28
(N.D. Ill. 1977).
45. 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
1981]
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had not been recognized before the merger of law and equity-
not a suggestion that a type of statute which had uniformly been
held to carry the right of jury trial should now be construed to
eliminate it."
The interpretation of Ross to require an examination of the
abilities of jurors on a case by case basis is also inconsistent with
the holding of the case and the legal principles cited by the Court.
The decision of the Court upheld the right of jury trial. In addition,
the text of the opinion annotated by the Ross footnote cited a "right
to jury trial on the legal claims which must not be infringed either
by trying the legal issues as incidental to the equitable ones or by a
court trial of common issues existing between the claims."'7
Moreover, the Court relied on the Fleitmann holding that the an-
titrust statutes could not be read as permitting the courts to dis-
pense with the right of jury trial. 8 Thus, the text of the Ross case is
inconsistent with the interpretation of the footnote that would per-
mit dispensing with juries in complex cases."
Although the Ross footnote provided the impetus for the move-
ment to limit the right of jury trial in complex cases, the third cir-
cuit did not rely fully on this passage as the basis for its decision in
Japanese Electronic Products. The court found it "unlikely" that the
Supreme Court would have "announced an important new applica-
tion of the Seventh Amendment in so cursory a fashion."'5 However,
the court did read the Ross footnote as opening the way for deci-
sions limiting "the range of suits subject to the seventh amendment
46. Id. at 428.
47. 396 U.S. at 538.
48. Id. at 536.
49. In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), the Court dropped the third part of
the Ross test in analyzing the issue of whether a jury trial was required in a fair hous-
ing case arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1968. It found that a jury trial was re-
quired and made no mention of any consideration of the practical limitations of juries.
The Court said: "The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory
rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and
remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law." Id. at
194. The omission of any mention of the third part of the Ross test led the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to discount the importance of this fac-
tor in Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1978), a case upholding the
right of jury trial in suits arising under the Truth in Lending Act. The fourth circuit
stated: "This third test [of Ross], however, was not reiterated by the Court in Curtis,
raising doubts as to its continued vitality." Id. at 225 n.25.
50. Japanese Elec. Prod., 631 F.2d at 1080. A similar view was expressed by the
ninth circuit in In re United States Fin. Se. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 425 (9th Cir.
1979): "After employing an historical test for almost two hundred years, it is doubtful
that the Supreme Court would attempt to make such a radical departure from its prior
interpretation of a constitutional provision in a footnote."
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.... I'll This interpretation may have been an important predicate
for the court's ultimate holding that the due process clause could be
used to remove certain cases from the reach of the seventh amend-
ment.
Approach of the Majority in Japanese Electronic Products
The due process analysis of the third circuit emanates from the
premise that the due process provision of the fifth amendment is
designed to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions. As the possi-
bility of error is enhanced when a jury may not fully understand the
evidence and the applicable legal principles, the court determined
that due process would preclude trying the case to a jury. In the
opinion of the court, this decision reflects the "most reasonable ac-
commodation between the two constitutional provisions.5 2
The decision to recognize a due process interest in minimizing
the risk of erroneous decisions was assertedly buttressed by the
finding that jury trials are not an essential element of due process
in civil cases. According to the court, the experience of the federal
courts in equitable actions proves that basic fairness can be achieved
in judge trials." Additionally, the court found support for its deci-
sion in the refusal of the Supreme Court to incorporate the right of
jury trial in civil cases as an element of due process required to be
accorded in the states under the fourteenth amendment." Thus, the
loss of the right to jury trial does not implicate the "fundamental
concerns""5 attendant to the increased risk of erroneous decisions.
Nor was the third circuit persuaded by other arguments favor-
ing the absolute right of jury trial. Although the decision to strike
the jury demand in advance necessarily depends on a prognostica-
tion of the difficulties that would be experienced by a jury, the
court found no difficulty with the hypothetical nature of the anal-
ysis. Indeed, the court drew support from this point, holding that
"the procedural requirements of due process are by their very
nature prospective . . . ."" The court also rejected arguments based
on the special abilities of the jury to apply community wisdom and
values, holding that these qualities have little meaning when the
jury does not understand the case." Finally, the court was unim-
51. 631 F.2d at 1080.
52. Id. at 1084.
53. Id. at 1085.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1084.
56. Id. at 1085.
57. Id
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pressed with the contention that juries are a necessity to provide a
needed check on judicial power: "A jury unable to understand the
evidence and legal rules is hardly a reliable and effective check on
judicial power." 8 In light of its analysis, the court declined to hold
that the right of jury trial under the seventh amendment is ab-
solute. Instead, in cases of sufficient complexity, it held that "the in-
terests protected by [the] procedural rule of due process carry
greater weight than the interests served by the constitutional
guarantee of jury trial."59
Analysis of the Decision
The decision in Japanese Electronic Products reflects the valid
doubts that are harbored by many persons in the legal system con-
cerning the competence of jurors to understand the especially com-
plex case. However, the analysis of the court fails to demonstrate
that the constitutional interest in preserving the right of jury trial
is outweighed by the values protected in a prospective decision to
strike the jury. In addition, the ruling is likely to produce results
that are at odds with its intended effect. Therefore, the decision
does not provide adequate justification for an abrupt departure from
the line of constitutional authority guaranteeing the right of jury
trial in antitrust treble damage cases.
First, although the opinion of the third circuit is presented as a
constitutional due process analysis, the primary interest served by
the ruling is not due process, but judicial economy. The rules of
judicial procedure already provide the litigants with adequate pro-
tection against the "due process" risk identified by the court: the
likelihood of erroneous decisions. The trial judge possesses the
power to protect the rights of litigants through procedures pro-
viding for summary judgment, directed verdict, judgment not-
withstanding the verdict, new trial, remititur and additur.® More-
over, through the use of special interrogatories, the court can deter-
mine the internal consistency of the decision of the jury and gauge
its understanding of the issues. The only added benefit served by
striking the jury demand in advance is to decrease the likelihood
that judicial effort will be wasted in the trial of a complex suit
because the jury fails to understand the issues. This interest is
doubtlessly important, reflecting the interests of the judiciary, the
litigants, and the jurors, but it is an administrative interest that
should not outweigh a specific constitutional value."1
58. Id at 1085.
59. Id.
60. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50, 56, & 59.
61. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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The interpretation that Japanese Electronic Products is a
"judicial economy" ruling is buttressed by an analysis of the factors
set forth by the court as the measure of complexity. Virtually all of
these factors are quantitative rather than qualitative in nature.
They include the length of the trial, the amount of evidence, the
number of issues, the amount of expert testimony, the length and
detail of jury instructions, and the number of separately disputed
issues relating to single transactions or items of proof. 2 These fac-
tors are more designed to gauge the amount of judicial effort re-
quired in a particular case than the ability of a jury to grasp the
issues. Indeed, given the difficulty of predicting in advance the com-
posite intelligence of any jury, the court probably could not have ar-
ticulated standards that would accurately predict the ability of a
jury to understand a given case. Therefore, the decision of the court
appears designed primarily to avoid the prospect of wasting judicial
resources.
Second, the decision of the court strikes an unjustified balance
of the competing constitutional interests. The so-called due process
6right" to be free from the risk of erroneous decisions is no right at
all: litigants will always face the possibility of error as long as
human beings in any capacity decide cases. An unquantified and
unquantifiable "minimization" of this risk may be an important in-
terest, but its status is more a reflection of the current beliefs of
some judges than of constitutional values. On the other hand, this
judge-created "right" is in direct conflict with a specific, texttral pro-
'vision of the Constitution that appears to guarantee absolutely the
right of jury trial. Whether or not this guarantee has been termed
"fundamental" for the purpose of application to the states, 3 its
presence in the text of the Constitution should provide it with pre-
eminent legal status in the federal system. In the "balancing" of con-
stitutional interests, the implications drawn by judges from a vague
guarantee should not prevail over a specific textual right.
Third, the right of jury trial protects a fundamental element of
due process that was not recognized by the third circuit. The court
dismissed the theory that the jury is a needed check on judicial
power, theorizing that a jury incapable of understanding the issues
could not secure "[o]ur liberties" as well as judges proceeding ra-
tionally and according to law. However, the interest protected by
the right to jury trial is more related to objectivity than liberty.
62. 631 F.2d at 1088.
63. The third circuit in Japanese Elec. Prod. relied on the failure of the Supreme
Court to rule that the right to a civil jury trial is an "essential element of ordered
liberty required of the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."
Id. at 1085.
1981]
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Most judges do proceed rationally, under the law, and in accord with
the evidence, but some are known to lean substantially toward
favored interests. These judges may sit on cases despite their bias,
producing unfair results in decisions couched in factual determina-
tions that protect against appeal. To a litigant faced with a biased
judge, the only possibility of a fair decision is usually the avenue of
a jury trial. This check against the unfair exercise of judicial power
is essential in our system, where judges are appointed for life and
the motion for recusal is seldom made because it is likely to be well-
remembered.
Fourth, the decision is likely to produce unmanageable conse-
quences for the judicial system. Given the current interest in the
issue cited by the third circuit,"4 it is likely that a large number of
litigants will accept the open invitation to attempt to strike their op-
ponents' jury demands. This effort will entail a showing of "complex-
ity" under the standards articulated by the court. Thus, for those
parties who wish to strike the jury, an essential element of trial tac-
tics will be to enhance the apparent complexity of the case through
the protraction of discovery, the creation and complication of issues,
the production of numerous experts on various matters, and the
asserted reliance on volumes of evidence. A determined litigant in
an antitrust, securities or other complex case, unless tightly con-
trolled by a strong trial court, can produce quantitative complexity
by a simple combination of will and effort. This conduct, however,
will have the side effect of unnecessarily burdening the judicial
system. The result of Japanese Electronic Products may be an in-
crease, rather than a decrease, in the waste of judicial resources.
The decision in Japanese Electronic Products is an unjustified
departure from the established law. This ruling strikes an inap-
propriate balance between the competing constitutional interests
and may produce a drain on judicial resources. The decision should
be reviewed by the Supreme Court to eliminate the conflict in the
circuits and, more importantly, to re-establish the legal rule enti-
tling a party to a jury trial in an antitrust treble damage case.
The Issue of Contribution Among Antitrust Tortfeasors
In a burst of decisions on the relatively unlitigated issue of
whether antitrust defendants may force joint tort-feasors to bear a
proportionate share of the damages awarded a plaintiff, a split de-
veloped among the circuits and the Supreme Court agreed to review
the question. In the first decision rendered on the issue by a court
64. I& at 1074.
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of appeals, the eighth circuit broke from district court precedent
and the "traditional federal common law rule" and held that contri-
bution may be enforced in an antitrust action. Professional Beauty
Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc. 5 In subsequent deci-
sions, however, both the fifth circuit, in Wilson P. Abraham Const.
Corp. v. Texas Industries, Inc.,6 and the tenth circuit, in Olson
Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,"7 held that a contribution claim
is not available to antitrust defendants. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to review Wilson P. Abraham."
The Split on the Contribution Issue
Under the federal common law, a defendant traditionally has
had no right to seek contribution from joint tort-feasors.9 Although
few published decisions actually confronted the issue, the federal
district courts generally applied this rule in antitrust cases."0 Thus,
if an antitrust plaintiff chose to exclude some tortfeasors from a
suit, the defendants had no right to bring third party actions against
the excluded parties to pay their pro rata shares of any damages. In-
stead, those parties included as defendants were required to pay the
entire award, regardless of whether other parties participated in the
conduct that injured the plaintiff.
The federal common law is applicable only to the extent that
Congress fails to direct a rule to be applied in a specific instance.
Thus, if the antitrust laws contained an explicit or implicit resolu-
tion of the contribution issue, this rule would control over the
general tort rule fashioned by the judiciary.7" All three courts of ap-
peals apparently agreed, however, that the Sherman and Clayton
65. 594 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1979). As the court pointed out, contribution had
been denied in prior federal district court decisions. See, e.g., Olson Farms, Inc. v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,698 (D. Utah 1977).
66. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979).
67. No. 939 ANTITRUST & TRUST REG. REP. (BNA) E-1 (10th Cir. 1979).
68. 101 S. Ct. __ (1980), sub nom., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc.
The Court initially granted certiorari in Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., an un-
published decision of the fifth circuit that denied the right of an antitrust defendant to
seek contribution from parties that have settled with the plaintiff. 100 S. Ct. 3008
(1980). However, the court revised its grant of certiorari and chose to hear the Wilson
P. Abraham case. 101 S. Ct. ( 1980).
It should be noted that the law firm in which this writer is a partner is involved in
the Wilson P. Abraham litigation and has an interest in the Supreme Court's deter-
mination.
69. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d
1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1979).
70. See note 63, supra.
71. See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus. Inc., 604 F.2d 897,
900-01 (5th Cir. 1979).
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Acts contain no directive on the contribution issue."2 Thus, the issue
became whether the underlying objectives of the antitrust laws jus-
tified a departure from federal common law. All three of the courts
devoted extensive discussion to various policy arguments for and
against a right of contribution.
The decision in Professional Beauty Supply was based primarily
on the factor of "fairness between the parties.""8 After rejecting a
number of policy arguments against a right of contribution, the
eighth circuit determined that fairness required the recognition of
this right. It stated: "There is an obvious lack of sense and justice in
a rule which permits the entire burden of restitution of a loss for
which two parties are responsible to be placed upon one alone
because of the plaintiff's whim or spite, or his collusion with the
other wrongdoer."7 ' This consideration, combined with the court's
determination that the objectives of the antitrust laws would be
undermined if "a significant number of antitrust violators [escaped]
liability for their wrongdoing," '" led to a determination that con-
tribution generally should be permitted. However, the court left the
way open for triers of fact to deny contribution in cases of excep-
tionally flagrant conduct by the party seeking contribution."
The decisions of the fifth and tenth circuits also reviewed the
policy arguments on the contribution issue, but both courts deter-
mined that the policy factors favoring contribution were insufficiently
persuasive to justify a new rule of law. In the Wilson P. Abraham
case, the decision was based in part on the fear that a rule favoring
contribution would diminish the deterrent effect of the treble dam-
age penalty and cause difficulties for plaintiffs by fostering an in-
crease in the overall size of antitrust suits. 7 One of the factors cited
in Olson Farms was the potential unmanageability of antitrust cases
if a right of contribution were permitted." The double-edged nature
of the contribution dispute led both courts to decline to enter "such
a complex policy thicket,' 79 instead leaving the resolution of the
issue to Congress."
72. Id. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594
F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1979); Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., no. 939 AN-
TITRUST & TRUST REG. REP. (BNA) E-1 (10th Cir. 1979).
73. 594 F.2d at 1185.
74. Id. at 1185-86.
75. Id. at 1185.
76. Id. at 1186.
77. 604 F.2d at 905.
78. No. 939 ANTITRUST & TRUST REG. REP. (BNA) E-1.
79. Id. at E-4.
80. Id.
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The Competing Policy Arguments
One of the primary policy issues discussed by the courts is the
question of whether a right of contribution would enhance or dimin-
ish the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws." The argument in
favor of increased deterrence is the contention that a rule allowing
contribution tends to ensure that all tortfeasors will be required to
pay their share of the treble damage penalty. Without this rule, it is
argued, some tortfeasors may be more inclined to engage in anti-
trust activity because of the increased prospect that they may
escape liability altogether.2 On the other hand, opponents of the
contribution rule argue that the possibility of sole liability for treble
damages carries an enhanced deterrent effect.8 This contention was
relied on by the fifth circuit, which cited "prevailing economic
theory"" and stated: "The chance that a participant may be faced
with a full judgment is more likely to discourage anticompetitive
conduct than would ensuring that each participant pays only some
fair share."'85 Each of these theories is probably true for some anti-
trust tortfeasors, but it is difficult to quantify the merit of either.
Thus, these contentions tend to cancel each other out.
The interest of fairness provides a strong argument in favor of a
rule permitting contribution. The idea of some joint tort-feasors
escaping liability, while others bear the entire cost of treble dam-
ages, would be inconsistent with a goal of distributing the loss on an
equitable basis. In a case in which the plaintiff's choice of defendants
is based on collusion with one of the conspirators or fear of retalia-
tion from a powerful enterprise, the requirement that only the named
defendants bear the loss appears particularly unfair." However, this
interest is not necessarily determinative of the issue, because the
antitrust laws were not designed to promote fairness for the
violators. The treble damage penalty in the antitrust laws estab-
lishes instead that the statute is designed to inflict losses on an-
titrust violators in excess of the damages they have caused. This ob-
jective of the antitrust laws significantly tempers the fairness argu-
ment.
81. See, e.g., Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus. Inc., 604 F.2d 897,
901 (5th Cir. 1979); Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc.,
594 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1979).
82. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d
1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1979).
83. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus. Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 (5th
Cr. 1979).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d
1179, 1185-86 (8th Cir. 1979).
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The strongest argument in favor of maintaining the no-contri-
bution rule is that it will promote the ability of plaintiffs to manage
and prosecute their lawsuits. This objective is consistent with the
purpose, reflected in the treble damage provisions of the antitrust
laws, of promoting enforcement of the statutes by litigants acting as
"private attorney generals."87 This purpose may be undercut if plain-
tiffs, which are usually outmanned in antitrust cases anyway, are
required to bear the costs of litigation that become larger than anti-
cipated through the addition of third party defendants. The anti-
trust plaintiff may not be able to afford the added expense and
burden of a suit involving all potential defendants.
More significiantly, the pro-contribution rule would eliminate a
major incentive for individual defendants to settle with the plaintiff
in cases involving multiple defendants. One of the overriding rea-
sons for settlement is to avoid the enormous legal costs that are
often associated with antitrust litigation. But this incentive disap-
pears if a settling defendant can be rejoined as a third party defend-
ant to ensure that it contributes its pro rata share of the damages.
Moreover, the certainty of ultimately paying a full pro rata share of
damages will leave a defendant disinclined to accept a favorable of-
fer from the plaintiff early in the litigation. Thus, the interest of
promoting early settlement-a means by which many plaintiffs are
able to finance the "big" antitrust case and reduce it to manageable
size-would be injured by a rule favoring contribution. This factor
has substantial importance, because the difficulty of financing and
effectively prosecuting antitrust claims is a major barrier to private
enforcement.
In Wilson P. Abraham Const. v. Texas Industries, Inc.,8 the
Supreme Court will have the opportunity to resolve the issue, and
its decision is likely to have a significant impact on future antitrust
enforcement.
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
Three significant antitrust decisions were rendered by the
Supreme Court in the October, 1979 term. In a case arising in New
Orleans, the Court continued its expansive interpretation of the jur-
isdictional reach of the Sherman Act by holding that real estate
brokerage activities may substantially affect interstate commerce.
In addition, the Court further reduced the impact of the "state ac-
tion" doctrine in decreeing that price-fixing activities are subject to
87. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969);
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
88. Cert. granted, - S. Ct. _ (1980).
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the Sherman Act even though the price fixing occurs pursuant to
state policy and enforcement. Finally, the Court decreed that an
agreement fixing credit terms is a per se violation of the Sherman
Act.
Reach of the Commerce Clause of the Sherman Act
In McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc.,89 the
Court clarified and expanded the reach of its jurisdictional decision
in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar." In the Goldfarb case, the Court
ruled that legal services, though performed wholly intrastate, were
subject to the Sherman Act where they were part of real estate
transactions involving significant interstate activities. The Court
relied on the "necessary connection"91 between the allegedly illegal
conduct and the interstate transactions arising because the title
examinations were necessary in real estate transactions. It added:
"Where, as a matter of law or practical necessity, legal services are
an integral part of the interstate transaction, a restraint on the
trade may substantially affect interstate commerce for Sherman Act
purposes."92
Although the Goldfarb decision maintained the Court's expan-
sive view of jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, the lower courts in
McLain viewed the Court's language as establishing a requirement
that the challenged activity be an "integral" part of the transactions
having interstate aspects." In McLain, the defendants were real
estate brokers charged with conspiring to fix brokerage prices in
the greater New Orleans area. The jurisdictional claim of the plain-
tiff was based on the contention, like the one relied on in Goldfarb,
that the brokerage activities were part of transactions having over-
all interstate aspects." However, both the district court and the
fifth circuit found that the challenged brokerage activities were not
an integral part of the interstate transactions." Brokerage services
were not necessary to the completion of real estate transactions and
only occasionally did brokers deal directly with the interstate
phases of procuring title insurance and financing for these sales."
89. 100 S. Ct. 502 (1980).
90. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
91. Id. at 784.
92. Id. at 785.
93. McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 502, 508 (1980).
94. 100 S. Ct. at 505-06.
95. McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc., 583 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir.
1978); McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc.. 432 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. La.
1977).
96. 432 F. Supp. at 985.
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Thus, both courts ruled that the claim should be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. 7
The Supreme Court reversed. It noted that two independent
theories may support jurisdiction in Sherman Act cases: (1) the chal-
lenged activities may be "in" interstate commerce, or (2) these ac-
tivities may have an "effect on commerce."" The language relied on
from Goldfarb was not controlling of McLain, it said, because the
"integral part" criterion was the basis on which the Court found the
attorneys' title searches to be "in" interstate commerce." The Court
said:
By placing the Goldfarb holding on the available ground that the
activities of the attorneys were within the stream of interstate
commerce, Sherman Act jurisdiction was established. The Gold-
farb holding was not addressed to the "effect on commerce" test
of jurisdiction and in no way restricted it to those challenged ac-
tivities that have an integral relationship to an activity in in-
terstate commerce.'"
Instead of requiring that the challenged brokerage activities be an
integral part of the interstate commerce associated with real estate
transactions, it is only necessary that the "activities which allegedly
have been infected by a price-fixing conspiracy be shown 'as a mat-
ter of practical economics' to have a not insubstantial effect on the
interstate commerce involved."'"' The Court believed that this show-
ing might be made at trial where, "as here, the services of respond-
ent real estate brokers are often employed in transactions in the
relevant market."'
10 2
McLain reaffirms the line of holdings of the Court that the Sher-
man Act reaches as far as the commerce clause permits to restrain
anticompetitive practices. " Jurisdiction may be established by a
showing that the challenged activities are "in" the stream of in-
terstate commerce or, under the broad "effect on commerce" theory,
that they have "an effect on some other appreciable activity demon-
strably in interstate commerce.""' This determination of effect is
made under a "not insubstantial"' analysis, a test that is likely to
encompass most of the economic activity in the United States.
97. 583 F.2d at 1321-23.
98. 100 S. Ct. at 509.
99. Id. at 510.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 511.
102. Id.
103. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1974).
104. 100 S. Ct. at 509.
105. Id. at 511.
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Restriction of the State Action Doctrine
The recent disinclination of the Court to apply the doctrine that
grants antitrust immunity for "state action" surfaced again in
California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.'"
The Court refused to apply the doctrine to a California system of
resale price maintenance in the marketing of wine. Although the
program was mandated by state law and enforced through state ac-
tion, the Court found that it violated the Sherman Act.
Under the state action doctrine established in Parker v. Brown,"7
actions of the state were held to be outside the scope of the anti-
trust laws. Thus, even if conduct would be illegal if engaged in by
private parties, it was immune from antitrust enforcement if engaged
in by the state. This doctrine, however, was determined to be inap-
plicable if the state merely attempted to sanction private illegal con-
duct.0 8 In recent years, the Court has restricted the scope of the
state action doctrine by refusing to apply it when the state "prompts"
rather than compels the anticompetitive activity' and when the
state plays a passive rather than an active role in the regulatory
scheme." However, the Court continued to apply the immunity
when the state actively participated in the anticompetitive
activity. 1'
The Midcal Aluminum case provided an opportunity to delineate
further the dividing line between immune and non-immune activity.
The California price-fixing system required all win6 producers,
wholesalers and rectifiers to file resale prices with the state and
precluded state-licensed wine merchants from reselling to retailers
at prices different from the prices on file."2 If a licensee made sales
at prices below the established prices, it faced state-imposed pen-
alties, including fines, license suspension, or license revocation."3
However, the state did not set the resale prices or review the rea-
sonableness of the prices set by wine dealers."'
The decision of the Court turned on the failure of the state to
actively participate in the price-setting activities. After reviewing
its prior decisions, the Court determined that there are two prereq-
106. 100 S. Ct. 937 (1980).
107. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
108. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
109. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
110. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
111. New Motor Vehicle Board of Calif. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
112. 100 S. Ct. at 940.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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uisites for antitrust immunity under the state action doctrine:
"First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second, the policy must be
'actively supervised' by the State itself."'1 5 The first criterion was
met by the California regulatory scheme because the policy was
"forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price
maintenance,""... but the second requirement was not met, despite
the state enforcement activities. The Court said:
The State simply authorizes price-setting and enforces the
prices established by private parties. The State neither
establishes prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the price
schedules; nor does it regulate the terms of fair trade contracts.
The State does not monitor market conditions or engage in any
'pointed reexamination' of the program. The national policy in
favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy
cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private
price fixing arrangement."'
The Court also held that the state program was not protected by
the twenty-first amendment to the Constitution." 8
The decision in Midcal Aluminum may give further impetus to
the trend of restrictions on the state action doctrine. The California
program was mandated and enforced by the state. The failure of
California to continuously monitor market conditions or the reason-
ableness of prices is the type of omission that may occur in the regu-
latory programs of many states. If so, these state laws may be sub-
ject to attack as inconsistent with the Sherman Act.
Application of the Per Se Rule to Credit Fixing
In Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.,"9 the Court held that an
agreement among competitors to deny credit terms to their cus-
tomers is a per se violation of the Sherman Act. According to the
complaint, the defendants, a group of beer wholesalers, agreed
among themselves to make sales to retailers only if payment was
made in advance or upon delivery of the beer. Credit terms alleg-
edly had been available prior to the agreement. The district court
denied a motion of the plaintiffs to declare the alleged practice a per
se violation and, in an interlocutory appeal, the ninth circuit af-
firmed. 2 '
115. Id. at 943.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 943-44.
118. Id. at 944-48.
119. 100 S. Ct. 1925 (1980).
120. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 605 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1979).
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In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed. It held
that credit terms are an "inseparable part of the price" '21 because
interest-free credit is the equivalent of a price discount equal to the
value of the use of the purchase price for the period credit is ex-
tended. Thus, an agreement fixing credit terms is a form of price
fixing. The Court stated: "An agreement to terminate the practice
of giving credit is thus tantamount to an agreement to eliminate dis-
counts, and thus falls squarely within the traditional per se rule
against price fixing." '122 Since the alleged credit fixing was simply
another form of price fixing, the Court held it should be "conclusively
presumed illegal without further examination under the rule of
reason."3
DECISIONS OF THE COURTS OF APPEALS
In addition to the cases involving the right of jury trial and the
issue of contribution among joint tort-feasors, significant decisions in
at least two areas were rendered by the courts of appeals. One of
these decisions affirmed a dismissal of the suit of the State of Mis-
souri against the National Organization for Women, Inc. resulting
from a convention boycott against states failing to pass the Equal
Rights Amendment. ' The ruling, which rested on the theory that
the Sherman Act is not intended to cover anticompetitive activity
that is politically motivated, produced a sharp division on a panel of
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In two other important
decisions, the ninth circuit ' and seventh circuit ' refused to apply
the rule against antitrust suits by indirect purchasers established in
Illinois Brick Company v. Illinois'" when the plaintiffs were parties
purchasing from a division or subsidiary of a co-conspirator ' or an
intermediary alleged to be a co-conspirator with the original seller. '
The National Organization for Women Decision
In State of Missouri v. National Organization for Women, 3 ' the
court held that the Sherman Act was not intended to apply to a
"politically motivated but economically tooled boycott participated
121. 100 S. Ct. at 1928.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1929.
124. State of Missouri v. National Organization for Women Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 122 (1980).
125. Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1980).
126. Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 617 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1980).
127. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
128. Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1980).
129. Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 617 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1980).
130. 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980).
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in and organized by noncompetitors"'3' of the victims of the boycott.
The National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW) organized a con-
vention boycott against all states that had not ratified the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA). This boycott was undertaken to inflict
economic harm on private business interests catering to the conven-
tion trade in order to achieve the political purpose of persuading
legislators to vote for the ERA. Economic damage was caused to
businesses in Missouri, spreading adverse effects to .'all parts of the
economy of the state,"'"3 2 and the state filed a suit under the Clayton
Act for injunctive relief to end the boycott. The district court dis-
missed the case and the eighth circuit affirmed, holding that
"NOW's activities were political and thus not within the scope of the
Sherman Act .... 13
The conclusion of the court in the National Organization for
Women case is supported primarily by its reading of the Supreme
Court decision in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc.3 ' In Noerr, the Supreme Court held that the
Sherman Act was not applicable to a publicity campaign undertaken
by a group of railroads for the purpose of fostering legislation harm-
ful to the trucking industry. Although this action was concerted ac-
tivity designed to achieve an anticompetitive end, the Court found
that it was not actionable because "no violation of the Act can be
predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforce-
ment of laws." 3 ' Because the boycott sponsored by NOW was an at-
tempt to influence the passage of legislation, just as the publicity
campaign in Noerr was designed to accomplish this purpose, the
court reasoned that the boycott was outside the scope of the Sher-
man Act.'
A sharp dissent by Senior Judge Gibson contended that the ma-
jority had made an "over-board interpretation of the Noerr case."" 7
The dissent focused on the action of NOW, the use of an economic
boycott, rather than on the ultimate purpose of fostering the pas-
sage of the ERA. It stated: "The anticompetitive economic and com-
mercial effects of the boycott on Missouri's legitimate business in-
terests and welfare are identical, regardless of whether the motiva-
tion for the boycott is political or economic."'38 Concluding that the
131. Id. at 1302.
132. Id. at 1303.
133. Id. at 1302.
134. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
135. Id. at 135.
136. 620 F.2d 1309-16.
137. 620 F.2d at 1319 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1323.
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political purpose alone is insufficient to immunize activity that is
covered by the literal terms of the Sherman Act, Judge Gibson
asserted that the case should be remanded for a full evaluation of
the competing interests in the protection of competition and the
preservation of first amendment freedoms.13'
If the balancing proposed by Judge Gibson were conducted, the
result might well be the same as that reached by the majority.
Although the NOW boycott may have caused economic damage to
Missouri businesses, its impact is spread sufficiently throughout the
country to limit the potential damage to competition in any par-
ticular area. In addition, the overriding political purpose of the
boycott could justify a decision to protect it under the first amend-
ment. Thus, the decision of the majority, though cast as an inter-
pretation of the scope of coverage of the antitrust laws, may have
reflected a subjective balancing of the type proposed by the dissent.
Regardless of the outcome of a balancing test, however, the con-
clusions drawn by the majority are based on a questionable interpre-
tation of the Noerr decision. The majority's analysis is almost dogged
in its refusal to deal with the essential difference between the Noerr
and National Organization for Women cases: in Noerr, private par-
ties sought to persuade the government to take the action that
would be injurious to competition, while in National Organization
for Women, the private parties engaged in the anticompetitive activ-
ity in an effort to achieve their legislative goals. The foray of NOW
into the economic world with a weapon long recognized as anathema
to free competition"' is hardly the same as the action of undertaking
a publicity campaign.
In addition, the court failed to analyze the critical distinction
between anticompetitive conduct undertaken by the government
and the anticompetitive actions of private parties. The anticompeti-
tive effects contemplated in Noerr presumably would have been
legal, because anticompetitive activities engaged in by the state
traditionally have been immunized from antitrust liability under the
'"state action" doctrine announced in Parker v. Brown."' On the
other hand, the state action exception is not available to protect the
economic conduct of a private organization. Thus, the concerted
activity in Noerr was not illegal in and of itself and was designed to
produce a result not barred by the antitrust laws.
The result in National Organization for Women is also troubling
139. Id. at 1323-26.
140. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators'
Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Com'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
141. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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for its tenacious focus on "purpose" as the only determinant of the
applicability of the Sherman Act. This interpretation ignores the
harm that can be caused by the conduct of those who collaborate to
harm competitors. The generalized boycott of NOW and groups in
sympathy with it may not destroy the economy of Missouri, but a
more localized victim or group of victims could be chosen whose loss
could significantly injure competition.' 2 In such a situation, the ac-
tions of the boycotting groups would be deeply inconsistent with the
purposes of the Sherman Act, yet this conduct would relate to the
political process only to the extent that the destruction of the
"hostage" is assertedly designed indirectly to foster a political end.
The strong interest of American society in preventing the destruc-
tion of the economic system, compared to the relatively weak in-
terest in preserving the indirect method of injuring third parties to
coerce political action, suggests that the focus on purpose alone may
produce results that are harmful to the. public welfare.
The decision of the eighth circuit ascribes too much weight to
the precedential impact of Noerr. Moreover, the analysis of the
court fails to balance adequately the competing interests at stake
when a group threatens to destroy competition to achieve a political
end. The categorical exemption from antitrust liability of the anti-
competitive activity undertaken to indirectly coerce legislative ac-
tion is unjustified. The ruling, if it lays the basis for future an-
ticompetitive activity for "political" purposes, could have a signifi-
cant adverse impact on the economic system.
The Exceptions to Illinois Brick Company v. Illinois
Illinois Brick v. Illinois'3 established the rule that only those
firms that purchase goods directly from antitrust violators may sue
for damages under the Clayton Act. The rule was adopted primarily
for two reasons: (1) to avoid the possibility that violators might be
held liable to multiple parties for the same overcharges,' 4 and (2) to
avoid the complexities of proof attendant to separating out each
potential plaintiffs damages.'' Indirect purchasers generally may
not recover any damages, even if the overcharges were "passed on"
to them by their suppliers. Two decisions of the courts of appeals,
142. As an example, a decision by NOW and other women's groups to boycott
Chrysler Corporation automobiles could result in the failure of this company, with the
result that market power would be further concentrated in the other car manufac-
turers.
143. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
144. Id. at 730.
145. Id. at 730-31.
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however, refused to apply this rule where special relationships ex-
isted between the original seller and the intermediary.
In Royal Printing Company v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., the ninth
circuit held that the indirect purchaser rule should not be applied
when the intermediary is a division or a subsidiary of a co-con-
spirator. Because a subsidiary or a division of a company probably
would not be allowed to bring an antitrust suit for overcharges, the
court reasoned that the creation of an additional group of potential
claimants would not bring about the danger of multiple liability that
led to the Illinois Brick ruling. '47 Moreover, the court avoided the
problem of undue complexity by holding that the indirect buyer
could sue for the entire amount of the overcharge.'48 Although this
result might produce a windfall gain if the entire overcharge was
not passed on by the intermediary, there was "nothing wrong [with
this result] so long as the antitrust laws are vindicated and the
defendant does not suffer multiple liability .... "149
A similar result was reached in Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna
Aircraft Company,5 ' though the court merely refused to uphold a
summary judgment where it was alleged that the intermediary was
a co-conspirator with the original seller. It stated: "We are not sat-
isfied that the Illinois Brick rule directly applies in circumstances
where the manufacturer and the intermediary are both alleged to be
co-conspirators in a common illegal enterprise resulting in intended
injury to the buyer.. 51 The case was remanded for a trial.
CONCLUSION
The major developments in the field of antitrust may have a
significant impact on the process in which antitrust issues are
resolved. The circumscription of the right of jury trial is apparently
aimed at promoting judicial economy, but this decision undermines a
constitutional procedure that tends to ensure an objective trier of
fact. In addition, the ruling could induce some litigants to conduct
their cases in a manner designed to promote complexity, thereby in-
creasing the burden on the judiciary. The split in the circuits on the
contribution issue presents the important question of how to appor-
tion damages among antitrust violators. The resolution of this issue
may significantly affect the incentive for individual defendants in
146. 621 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1980).
147. Id. at 326.
148. Id. at 327.
149. Id.
150. 617 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1980).
151. Id. at 481.
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conspiracy cases to settle with the plaintiff. The decisions of the
Supreme Court in the 1979 term broadened the scope of Sherman
Act jurisdiction, further restricted the "state action" exception to
antitrust liability, and established that credit fixing is a per se viola-
tion. In other decisions of the courts of appeals, a political boycott
was ruled outside the scope of the Sherman Act, and the Illinois
Brick rule against suits by indirect purchasers was not applied to
cases in which special relationships existed between the seller and
the intermediary.
